When should the regulator be left alone in the commons? How fishing cooperatives can help ameliorate inefficiencies

Juan Rosas-Munoz, Ana Espinola-Arredondo and Felix Munoz-Garcia

Resource and Energy Economics, 2024, vol. 77, issue C

Abstract: This paper examines a common-pool resource where quotas and fines are set by a regulator, an artisanal organization (cooperative), or both. We analyze the interaction between these two regulatory agencies under a flexible policy regime, where quotas and fines can be revised across periods, and under an inflexible policy regime, where they cannot. We show that inefficiencies arise in the inflexible regime, but they are reduced when the two agencies coexist. Overall, we demonstrate that the artisanal organization may be preferred when environmental damages are low, but the regulator may be preferable otherwise.

Keywords: Common-pool resource; Regulation; Artisanal organization; Flexible policy; Inflexible policy; Inefficiencies (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H23 L13 Q50 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:resene:v:77:y:2024:i:c:s0928765524000101

DOI: 10.1016/j.reseneeco.2024.101434

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