Risk and reward in rail contracting

Gunnar Alexandersson, Chris Nash and John Preston

Research in Transportation Economics, 2008, vol. 22, issue 1, 31-35

Abstract: This workshop considered the role of risks and rewards in rail transport by considering evidence on the impacts of industry structure, franchising and infrastructure charges. A schema for the allocation of risks and rewards was developed, which indicated that strategic risks should be borne by authorities and operational risks by operators, but that tactical risks were more difficult to allocate and appropriate reward mechanisms more difficult to design. The extent to which these difficulties can be addressed by competitive tendering and alternatives such as trusting partnerships and negotiated performance based contracts was considered.

Date: 2008
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