Optimal economic interventions in scheduled public transport

Kjell Jansson, Harald Lang and Dan Mattsson

Research in Transportation Economics, 2008, vol. 23, issue 1, 30-40

Abstract: This chapter analyses appropriate regulatory instruments for public transport markets under monopoly and competition, respectively. For the monopoly case, the operator chooses too low supply, compared to welfare optimum. In contrast, for the competition case the operators choose too high supply, at least for the competition model that we have considered most appropriate. It is found that under monopoly a subsidy should be applied, while under competition taxation should be applied.

Date: 2008
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