 Cooperation among freight forwarders: Mode choice and intermodal freight transportNaima Saeed Research in Transportation Economics, 2013, vol. 42, issue 1, 77-86 Abstract: The objective of this paper is to compare vertical and horizontal cooperation among freight forwarders. The paper analyses three freight forwarders (‘players’) with two different means of transportation. The first two players are truck-operating freight forwarders. The third player is a freight forwarder with its own ship. For the purposes of analysis, the paper applied a two-stage game. The results revealed that the best form of cooperation is the one in which the large truck-operating company would establish a coalition with the ship-operating company; that is, vertical cooperation. This cooperation would generate better payoffs in the form of profit, not only to the members of this coalition, but also to the player that has not joined the coalition. However, user surplus is negative in all coalitions, which shows that the establishment of these kinds of cooperation is not beneficial (in terms of prices) for the users of these service providers. Keywords: Freight forwarders; Intermodal-transport; Game theory; Bertrand model; Coalition (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:retrec:v:42:y:2013:i:1:p:77-86 Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from DOI: 10.1016/j.retrec.2012.11.005 Access Statistics for this article Research in Transportation Economics is currently edited by M. Dresner More articles in Research in Transportation Economics from Elsevier |
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