Primary auction of slots at European airports

Thomas Pertuiset and Georgina Santos ()

Research in Transportation Economics, 2014, vol. 45, issue C, 66-71

Abstract: We use the Vickrey–Clarke–Groves auction mechanism to propose a system of primary auctions of slots at congested European airports. The system would ensure allocative efficiency and would be incentive-compatible, flexible, understandable, implementable and transparent. Only 10% of slots would be auctioned per year. The current slot coordination mechanism used in Europe, based on historic use of slots, would thus be phased out and disappear within a decade.

Keywords: Airport congestion; Slot trading; Auctions; Vickrey auction; Vickrey–Clarke–Groves auction; Grandfather rights; Slot coordination (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 R41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0739885914000304
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:retrec:v:45:y:2014:i:c:p:66-71

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.elsevier.com/wps/find/supportfaq.cws_home/regional
https://shop.elsevie ... _01_ooc_2&version=01

DOI: 10.1016/j.retrec.2014.07.009

Access Statistics for this article

Research in Transportation Economics is currently edited by M. Dresner

More articles in Research in Transportation Economics from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().