Structural reforms in the railways: Incentive misalignment and cost implications

Chris A. Nash, Andrew S.J. Smith, Didier van de Velde, Fumitoshi Mizutani and Shuji Uranishi

Research in Transportation Economics, 2014, vol. 48, issue C, 16-23

Abstract: In Europe, many countries have completely separated their railways into totally separate infrastructure managers and railway undertakings (train operators) and the European Commission has sought to make such complete vertical separation a legal requirement.

Keywords: Structure; Railways; Incentives; Cost; Transactions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D23 L22 L24 L92 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

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DOI: 10.1016/j.retrec.2014.09.027

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