Workshop 2 report: Effective institutional design, regulatory frameworks and contract strategies

Wijnand Veeneman and Andrew Smith

Research in Transportation Economics, 2016, vol. 59, issue C, 60-64

Abstract: This paper describes the progress of world-wide research on institutional design, both on the level of the regulatory regime as well as on the level of the governance of the relation between authority and operator of public transport services. Tendering has found its way into regulatory frameworks and has become a mainstay of governance. A first conclusion is that tendering has become mature, with consequences for existing and new implementations, with refined and contextual lessons coming from research. A second conclusion shows that governance design should intelligently balance including power and control oriented elements with empathic and cooperation oriented elements. A first framework for the analysis of this balance is provided in this paper.

Keywords: Public transport; Tendering; Governance; Regulatory frameworks (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:retrec:v:59:y:2016:i:c:p:60-64

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DOI: 10.1016/j.retrec.2016.10.003

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