CEO inside debt and bank loan syndicate structure
Liqiang Chen and
Review of Financial Economics, 2017, vol. 34, issue C, 74-85
This paper investigates the effects of a borrowing firm's CEO inside debt holdings on the structure of the firm's syndicated loans. When a borrowing firm's CEO has a higher level of inside debt holdings, syndicate loans have a larger number of lenders and are less concentrated, and lead arrangers will retain a smaller portion of loans. In addition, CEO inside debt holdings have a lesser effect on the syndicate structure when lead arrangers have a prior lending relationship with the borrowing firm or the CEOs are close to retirement, while CEO inside debt holdings have greater influence on the syndicate structure when the borrowing firm has low information transparency.
Keywords: Executive compensation; Inside debt; Syndicate loans (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G3 G21 G32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:revfin:v:34:y:2017:i:c:p:74-85
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