Does central bank governors term in office matter for macroprudential policies? Evidence from MENA banks
Research in International Business and Finance, 2017, vol. 40, issue C, 34-51
Using a comprehensive dataset on MENA banks, we examine whether CB governors use of macroprudential instruments affect bank risk. The findings indicate that the CB governors’ use of such instruments does not significantly reduce bank risk. We propose two hypotheses as to why CB governor are inclined to employ such instruments. Based on the findings, it appears that the decision to use such instruments is dictated more by macroeconomic considerations as opposed to peer pressure concerns.
Keywords: Macroprudential; Central bank governor; Peer pressure; Entrenchment; Banking; MENA (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G21 G28 E58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:riibaf:v:40:y:2017:i:c:p:34-51
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