Monitoring or empowering CEOs? The moderating effect of shareholder rights

Bilal Al Dah

Research in International Business and Finance, 2018, vol. 46, issue C, 502-515

Abstract: This paper explains the conflicting evidence found on agency and stewardship theories in the previous literature, by introducing shareholder rights as a moderator for the board independence-firm performance relationship. Consistent with agency (stewardship) theory, increasing (decreasing) board independence increases firm performance when shareholder rights are low (high). The results are more pronounced after the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002, when firms where required to increase their percentage of independent directors regardless of their governance structure. We conclude that corporate governance cannot be thought of as one-size-fits-all: a multi-theoretical approach is recommended to better understand the various aspects of corporate governance.

Keywords: Shareholder rights; Antitakeover provisions; Board independence; Managerial entrenchment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:riibaf:v:46:y:2018:i:c:p:502-515

DOI: 10.1016/j.ribaf.2018.06.006

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