Dividend policy and political uncertainty: Evidence from the US presidential elections
Omar Farooq and
Research in International Business and Finance, 2019, vol. 48, issue C, 201-209
This paper shows that dividend policies adopted by the US firms are sensitive to presidential elections. Using a large dataset covering six presidential elections (1996–2016), we show that firms pay higher percentage of their earnings as dividends during the election years relative to non-election years. We also show that this sensitivity is confined only to the presidential elections. The gubernatorial elections have no impact on dividend policies adopted by firms. Furthermore, our results suggest that higher are the economic uncertainties (uncertainties related to monetary policies, fiscal policies, and national security policies) in the years of election, higher are the dividend payout ratios. Lastly, we show that firms that pay high dividends during the years of presidential elections have higher value than otherwise similar firms that pay low dividends.
Keywords: Dividend policy; Presidential elections; Political; Uncertainty; Information asymmetry (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:riibaf:v:48:y:2019:i:c:p:201-209
Access Statistics for this article
Research in International Business and Finance is currently edited by T. Lagoarde Segot
More articles in Research in International Business and Finance from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Dana Niculescu ().