 The political economy of relationship bankingIgor Lončarski and Matej Marinč Research in International Business and Finance, 2020, vol. 51, issue C Abstract: In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, banks need to reevaluate their position in light of profound changes in the economic, social, and political landscape. On the one hand, we emphasize the benefits of relationship banking, which establishes close contact with bank customers. Through a long-term orientation, relationship banking aligns incentives and supports the long-term needs of bank customers, leading to reduced inequality and greater firm innovation. On the other hand, the interaction between politics and relationship banking can have dark sides. First, with new borders arising and competition in banking affected, relationship banking might be particularly prone to political interference. Second, a shock to the relationship bank can be transmitted to its borrowers. We analyze how relationship banking can overcome its drawbacks. Keywords: Banking; Relationship banking; Financial crisis; Political interference; Politics (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:riibaf:v:51:y:2020:i:c:s0275531919306014 DOI: 10.1016/j.ribaf.2019.101078 Access Statistics for this article Research in International Business and Finance is currently edited by T. Lagoarde Segot More articles in Research in International Business and Finance from Elsevier |
Is your work missing from RePEc? Here is how to contribute.
Questions or problems? Check the EconPapers FAQ or send mail to .
EconPapers is hosted by the
School of Business at Örebro University.