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Independence in bank governance structure: Empirical evidence of effects on bank risk and performance

S.M. Harkin, Davide Salvatore Mare () and J.N. Crook

Research in International Business and Finance, 2020, vol. 52, issue C

Abstract: We investigate how different governance arrangements affect risk and return in banks. Using a new data set for UK banks over the period 2003–2012, we employ a simultaneous equations framework to control for the reciprocal relationship between risk and return. We show that separation of the roles of CEO and Chairman increases bank risk without causing a concurrent increase in return. We also find that oversight by a Remuneration Committee and Non-Executive Directors (NEDs) lowers the probability of bank failure, indicating that empowering an independent Chairman has different effects from empowering independent NEDs. Overall, our results underline the importance of accounting for the heterogeneity in corporate governance arrangements within banks.

Keywords: Bank; Risk; Performance; Ownership; Simultaneous equations (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C30 G21 G28 G32 G34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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DOI: 10.1016/j.ribaf.2019.101177

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