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The role of internal corporate governance mechanisms on default risk: A systematic review for different institutional settings

Laura Ballester, Ana González-Urteaga and Beatriz Martínez

Research in International Business and Finance, 2020, vol. 54, issue C

Abstract: Recent financial downturns, characterized by the significant failures of firms, have revealed the need to control credit risk. Latest literature has shown that weak corporate governance structures are related to high levels of default risk, leading to financial instability. In this context, we aim to summarize the literature that focuses on the role that internal corporate governance plays in the credit risk of firms, specifically considering three corporate governance components: ownership structure, board structure and financial stakeholders’ rights and relations. Additionally, we analyse whether the effectiveness of the internal mechanisms depends on particular key factors, especially the institutional setting and the type of mechanisms considered. Finally, new lines of research are identified for future research.

Keywords: Credit risk; Corporate governance; Institutional setting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G15 G32 G34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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DOI: 10.1016/j.ribaf.2020.101293

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