 Collective asset management under corporate governance theoryYang Sun, Yu Zhang and Xinwei Tang Research in International Business and Finance, 2024, vol. 67, issue PB Abstract: The shareholding system for collective assets (SSCA) reform improves collective asset management with the help of corporate governance theory. This reform transforms collective asset management into a corporate governance structure subordinated to shareholders and the collectives' interests. Therefore, this reform can affect residents' disposable income and collective asset size. In this study, the time-varying Difference-in-Difference estimation model is used to examine the impact of the SSCA reform on collective asset size and residents' disposable income. This study shows that the SSCA reform is conducive to increasing residents' disposable income and expanding the size of collective assets. Further research shows that the SSCA reform can increase residents' disposable income by expanding the size of community dividends. The SSCA reform can expand the size of collective assets by reducing collective asset indebtedness. Keywords: Reform of the shareholding system; Collective asset size; Residents' disposable income (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:riibaf:v:67:y:2024:i:pb:s0275531923002635 DOI: 10.1016/j.ribaf.2023.102137 Access Statistics for this article Research in International Business and Finance is currently edited by T. Lagoarde Segot More articles in Research in International Business and Finance from Elsevier |
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