 Internal control opinion shopping: Does initial audit fee discounting matter?Wu-Po Liu and Hua-Wei Huang Research in International Business and Finance, 2024, vol. 69, issue C Abstract: Both regulators and researchers are concerned that the lowballing of initial year audit fees may impair auditor independence (U.S. Senate 1977, 2002; American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA), 1978; Securities and Exchange Commission [SEC], 2000; Huang et al. 2015). Using a full sample of 1373 U.S. firm-year observations for which the client’s predecessor auditor reports an adverse SOX Section 404 internal control opinion, we find that in the following year a successor auditor who lowballs audit fees is more likely to issue a clean internal control opinion. The results hold when the predecessor auditors are dismissed, but not when the predecessors resign. We also find that firms are no more likely to succeed in opinion shopping when the proportion of audit committee financial experts is high. In addition, we find internal control opinion shopping occurs with initial fee discounting only in competitive audit markets and the period of a few years following the adoption of SOX (since 2007). Keywords: Audit fee discounting; Initial audit engagement; Opinion shopping; Internal control weakness; Resignation and dismissal; Audit market competition (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:riibaf:v:69:y:2024:i:c:s0275531924000400 DOI: 10.1016/j.ribaf.2024.102248 Access Statistics for this article Research in International Business and Finance is currently edited by T. Lagoarde Segot More articles in Research in International Business and Finance from Elsevier |
Is your work missing from RePEc? Here is how to contribute.
Questions or problems? Check the EconPapers FAQ or send mail to .
EconPapers is hosted by the
School of Business at Örebro University.