National legislatures and corporate transparency

Richard W. Carney, Ruiyuan Chen, Sadok El Ghoul and Omrane Guedhami

Research in International Business and Finance, 2024, vol. 71, issue C

Abstract: The purpose of this study is to posit and test whether the presence and structure of national legislatures can account for the varying degree of corporate transparency displayed by firms operating in emerging economies. We conducted tests using a sample of 226,088 firm-level observations spanning 67 countries over the period 1990–2014. Firms located in political regimes that lack national legislatures display a lower level of transparency than those in regimes with semi-competitive legislative elections, and these in turn display lower transparency than firms located in countries with competitive elections.

Keywords: institutional theory; transparency; opacity; corporate earnings; emerging economies; authoritarian regimes (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 M41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:riibaf:v:71:y:2024:i:c:s0275531924002344

DOI: 10.1016/j.ribaf.2024.102441

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