 Analyst tracking and innovation inconsistency in companiesJing Qiu and Dan Li Research in International Business and Finance, 2024, vol. 71, issue C Abstract: Disclosing corporate innovation information plays a crucial role in investors’ decision-making. It is important to regulate the consistency between a company’s words and actions to ensure that their narrative innovation disclosures accurately reflect their innovation activities. This study utilizes data from Chinese A-share listed companies from 2011 to 2022 and explores the governance role of analyst coverage on corporate innovation inconsistency from a flexible governance perspective. The research finds that analyst tracking promotes a company’s innovation inconsistency of “saying less and doing more” through the information effect and suppresses “saying more and doing less” through the monitoring effect. Further, analysts who work harder, have higher education levels, are more motivated, and demonstrate greater independence and objectivity significantly impact companies’ innovation inconsistency. This study is of great theoretical and practical significance for understanding innovation inconsistency in companies, as well as the role of analysts in the capital market. Keywords: Analyst coverage; Inconsistency of innovation; Information effect; Supervision effect (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:riibaf:v:71:y:2024:i:c:s0275531924002770 DOI: 10.1016/j.ribaf.2024.102484 Access Statistics for this article Research in International Business and Finance is currently edited by T. Lagoarde Segot More articles in Research in International Business and Finance from Elsevier |
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