Collaboration and regulation: A dual regulatory game for the sustainable development of green housing

Qianwen Li, Tingyu Qian, Qian Hua, Jialin Min, Yizhuo Zhao, Qingyuan Wang and Ruyin Long

Research in International Business and Finance, 2025, vol. 74, issue C

Abstract: The promotion of green housing can significantly reduce energy consumption and greenhouse gas emissions in the construction industry, thereby contributing to the achievement of the dual-carbon goal. However, the frequent occurrence of greenwashing, loan defaults, green debt, and other risks has created an urgent need for stronger government supervision of the green housing market, improved bank capital supervision mechanisms, and greater collaboration between property developer and residents to promote the sustainable development of green housing, ensuring its sustainability and compliance. This study constructs a four-party evolutionary game model involving the core stakeholders of green housing—government, bank, property developer, and resident—to clarify the long-term stable choices of each stakeholder under the dual regulation mode of government and bank. The effectiveness of dual regulation is further confirmed through simulation and sensitivity analysis. The study results indicate that: (1) Under the collaboration strategy, increased government regulation raises the likelihood that bank will also regulate, facilitating the formation of a dual regulation mode. Property developer is more likely to engage in compliant green housing development under this mode, and residents will choose to buy green housing. (2) Under the regulatory strategy, both incentive subsidies and mandatory penalties are effective. The stronger these measures, the more likely property developer will choose compliant green housing development. Finally, based on the study's conclusions, recommendations are proposed to promote the sustainable development of green housing.

Keywords: Green housing; Dual regulation; Four-party evolutionary game; Collaboration; Regulatory law (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:riibaf:v:74:y:2025:i:c:s0275531924004902

DOI: 10.1016/j.ribaf.2024.102697

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