An experimental study into the influence of works council advice on managerial decision-making

Saraï Sapulete, Arjen van Witteloostuijn and Wesley Kaufmann

Scandinavian Journal of Management, 2014, vol. 30, issue 3, 358-371

Abstract: This paper experimentally studies the effect of works council advice on managerial decision-making, aiming to gain more insights into the fundamental mechanisms that may underlie the impact of works council advice. We conducted laboratory experiments in which subjects played a two-player Prisoner's Dilemma price-setting game as either a manager or works council representative. Half of the managers received an advice to opt for a low or a high price; the other half received no advice. Managers receiving advice to choose a low price (play Nash) have a higher tendency to choose a low price. Subjects with an other-regarding orientation tend to choose a high price. Furthermore, we found an interaction effect of advice for other-regarding managers.

Keywords: Employee participation; Managerial decision-making; Experimental economics; Advice (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:scaman:v:30:y:2014:i:3:p:358-371

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DOI: 10.1016/j.scaman.2014.03.001

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