Federative organizations: the effects of double binding contracts

Karin Jonnergård

Scandinavian Journal of Management, 1993, vol. 9, issue 3, 211-224

Abstract: A distinguishing feature of the federative organization is the ownership relationship. The owners are simultaneously both the providers of risk capital and the main suppliers (or customers) in relation to the unit owned. In other words there is a double binding contractual relation between owners and owned. In this paper the effects of the double binding contract are discussed, as well as the particular problems of contract fulfilment and organizing that occur in such organizations. A complementary coordination device, "the federative value system", is also defined.

Keywords: Federative; organization; ownership; contracts; principal-agent; relationship (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1993
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