Information avoidance in a polarized society

Philipp Chapkovski

Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), 2022, vol. 101, issue C

Abstract: This well-powered, pre-registered study explores how the behavior of dictators is affected by allowing them, in a give-or-take dictator game, to choose whether they want to know the recipient's position on a polarizing matter. Specifically, we study whether the option to avoid polarizing information reduces the polarization gap, i.e., the difference between the amounts given to recipients’ holding aligned and conflicting positions. We find that over 30% of dictators choose to avoid potentially polarizing information, and that this choice substantially decreases the polarization gap. We also find that those who choose to remain uninformed expect the polarization gap to be smaller than those who choose to be informed.

Keywords: Polarization; Information avoidance; Dictator game; Altruism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:soceco:v:101:y:2022:i:c:s2214804322001112

DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2022.101940

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