Economic incentives and political inequality in the management of environmental public goods

Francesco Bogliacino, César Mantilla and Daniel Niño

Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), 2023, vol. 104, issue C

Abstract: We study how the allocation of power in a voting procedure affects the regulation and extraction of environmental public goods. In an appropriation game experiment, different endowments induce heterogeneous preferences among the three group members regarding their preferred quota, aimed at increasing social efficiency by restricting aggregate extraction. The players vote by submitting a proposal; one among the submitted proposals is implemented, selected at random, but across treatments, we vary the odds that a type sets the regulation.

Keywords: Appropriation dilemma; Environment; Experiment; Public goods; Institutional choice (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 D62 D72 Q50 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2214804323000320
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:soceco:v:104:y:2023:i:c:s2214804323000320

DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2023.102006

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics) is currently edited by Pablo Brañas Garza

More articles in Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics) from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().