On the limits of hierarchy in public goods games: A survey and meta-analysis on the effects of design variables on cooperation

Stephan Billinger and Stephen Mark Rosenbaum

Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), 2023, vol. 107, issue C

Abstract: We contribute to the emerging literature on the influence of hierarchy on group cooperation by reporting the findings of a meta-analysis on data aggregated from 20 public goods game (PGG) studies that entail design variables relevant in hierarchies, comprising 51 treatments with effect sizes, and more than 48,000 observations. Our findings attest to the limited effect of hierarchical design variables on worker cooperation. Any positive effects were short-term, with punishment being the only mechanism capable of sustaining cooperation over the longer run. Contrary to popular conception, our results suggest that leaders/managers’ ability to facilitate group cooperation over time may not improve upon levels observed in the leaderless baseline experiments.

Keywords: Hierarchy; Leadership; Cooperation; Public goods game; Experiments; Meta-analysis; Organization design (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:soceco:v:107:y:2023:i:c:s2214804323001076

DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2023.102081

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