Choosing a victim you know

Dmitri Bershadskyy and Alexandra Seidel

Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), 2024, vol. 112, issue C

Abstract: Mobbing causes severe damages to the victims and is a prime example of antisocial coordination. Using the ‘mobbing game’ by Abbink and Doğan (2019), we investigate the role of communication and incremental incentives on mobbing in a laboratory experiment. Doing so, we vary the degree of strategic vs. social communication on the one hand and the pecuniary incentives of repeatedly bullying a certain victim on the other hand. Results indicate that incremental incentives increase nomination rates (i.e., attempts to mob another player) and mobbing rates (i.e., successful group coordination to reduce payoffs of one player). In contrast, communication decreases nomination rates without having significant effect on mobbing rates. Further, communication analysis indicates our approach to eliminate strategic communication was successful and can be applied in other setups.

Keywords: Antisocial; Communication; Coordination; Mobbing; Bullying (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:soceco:v:112:y:2024:i:c:s2214804324001022

DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2024.102265

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