Related examinations and tax compliance

Seiyoun Kim and Puneet Arora

Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), 2025, vol. 114, issue C

Abstract: One of the Internal Revenue Services' methods for audit is to pick individuals engaged in transactions with other taxpayers whose tax returns were selected for audit. Such related examination in the audit procedure introduces an externality where one's actions can potentially harm others. It can induce a different tax compliance behavior compared to the purely random audit mechanism. We propose a Simplified Related Examinations (SRE) audit mechanism and study its effectiveness against the Random Audit (RA) mechanism using a laboratory experiment. Our findings reveal that the SRE treatment significantly increases overall tax compliance and tax compliance at the extensive margin. We also analyze how varying factors like social distance, group size, and audit rate impact this effect.

Keywords: Tax compliance; Dishonesty; Experiments; Social norm; Shaming (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H20 H26 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:soceco:v:114:y:2025:i:c:s2214804324001630

DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2024.102326

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