Role-reversibility, stochastic ignorance, and social cooperation
Vincy Fon () and
Francesco Parisi
Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), 2008, vol. 37, issue 3, 1061-1075
Abstract:
This paper studies the effect of role-reversibility and stochastic ignorance, conditions that minimize the strategic bias of individual choice, on social cooperation. Under role-reversibility, each agent maximizes her expected payoff, knowing the status quo at the time of the action as well as the ex ante probabilities about her future roles. In contrast, under stochastic ignorance, players make their choices under a Harsanyi-type veil of uncertainty. Without the role-specific context influencing the judgment of the individual, cooperative norms emerging under stochastic ignorance are more likely to be close to first-best than are norms chosen under conditions of role-reversibility.
Date: 2008
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:soceco:v:37:y:2008:i:3:p:1061-1075
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