Enfranchisement and the welfare state: Institutional design of unemployment compensation

Wonik Kim

Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), 2008, vol. 37, issue 4, 1660-1678

Abstract: This paper examines the relationship between various political mechanisms and the variation in unemployment compensation programs (i.e., compulsory, voluntary, and assistance programs). I argue that the choice of a specific unemployment compensation program over others depends on the level of franchise extension. Using a multinomial logit analysis of 13 European countries from 1880 to 1945, I find that among other political mechanisms, franchise extension had the greatest impact on the likelihood of instituting unemployment compensation, controlling socio-economic factors. Greater enfranchisement is associated with a higher probability of choosing a compulsory program, but not a voluntary one.

Date: 2008
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:soceco:v:37:y:2008:i:4:p:1660-1678

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