Comparatism--A constructive approach in the philosophy of science

Jan Tullberg

Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), 2011, vol. 40, issue 4, 444-453

Abstract: The fundamental idea in the comparatist approach presented here is that a scientific theory is not judged to be right or wrong in itself, but as more true or false in comparison with an alternative. A comparison between two alternatives needs a standard and ultimately, truth is the standard of science. Comparatism follows the objectivist tradition. The most significant deviation from major ideas in the objectivist school is proposing a less dominating role for falsification. The comparatism perspective is then applied to some controversies of methodology in economics. Comparatism is claimed to be a descriptive model for much of science and to be a normative model for constructive guidance of scientific inquiry.

Keywords: Comparative; evaluation; Inductionism; Falsification; Research; program (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:soceco:v:40:y:2011:i:4:p:444-453

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