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Does labor contract completeness drive unionization? Experimental evidence

Sean Flynn and Michael Donnelly

Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), 2012, vol. 41, issue 4, 445-454

Abstract: Flynn (2005) proposes that the degree to which labor contracts are complete may be a major driving force behind the propensity of employees to unionize. We find behavior consistent with this hypothesis in an experimental production game in which subjects are assigned to playing either employers or employees. The rate at which employees opt for a proxy for unionization more than triples when the labor-contracting regime under which they are working shifts from incomplete to complete labor contracts. Complete labor contracts drive out positive reciprocity, anger workers, and increase their desire to unionize.

Keywords: Unions; Labor contracts; Labor contract completeness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J41 J51 J53 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:soceco:v:41:y:2012:i:4:p:445-454

DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2011.07.002

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