Tempting righteous citizens? Counterintuitive effects of increasing sanctions in the realm of organized crime

Tim Friehe

Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), 2013, vol. 44, issue C, 37-40

Abstract: This paper demonstrates that increasing the expected sanction for a crime may increase this crime's prevalence, using a principal–agent model with different kinds of crime that is typical of organized crime. The intuition for the finding is that the policy change may increase the principal's expected payoff from crime by decreasing the information rent required by the agent.

Keywords: Crime; Principal–agent relation; Information rent (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H23 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:soceco:v:44:y:2013:i:c:p:37-40

DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2013.02.016

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