Gender at work: Incentives and self-sorting

Matteo Migheli ()

Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), 2015, vol. 55, issue C, 10-18

Abstract: This paper analyses the relationship between workers’ gender and monetary incentives in an experimental setting based on a double-tournament scheme. The participants must choose between a piece-rate payment or a performance prize. The results show that women fail to reveal their type, and are less sensitive than men to the monetary incentives of the tournament. In addition, the tournament scheme induces males, but not females, to signal their ability and to select the contract which is more profitable for them.

Keywords: Gender; Discrimination; Incentives; Work; Experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 J16 J41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2214804314001268
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:soceco:v:55:y:2015:i:c:p:10-18

DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2014.12.005

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics) is currently edited by Pablo Brañas Garza

More articles in Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics) from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().