Strategic behaviour in Schelling dynamics: Theory and experimental evidence
Juan Benito (),
Penelope Hernandez () and
Sanchis-Llopis, Juan A.
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Juan A. Sanchis Llopis ()
Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), 2015, vol. 57, issue C, 134-147
In this paper we experimentally test Schelling’s (1971) segregation model and confirm the striking result of segregation. In addition, we extend Schelling’s model theoretically by adding strategic behaviour and moving costs. We obtain a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in which rational agents facing moving costs may find it optimal not to move (anticipating other participants’ movements). This equilibrium is far from full segregation. We run experiments for this extended Schelling model, and find that the percentage of full segregated societies notably decreases with the cost of moving and that the degree of segregation depends on the distribution of strategic subjects.
Keywords: Subgame perfect equilibrium; Segregation; Experimental games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: Strategic behaviour in Schelling dynamics: Theory and experimental evidence (2015)
Working Paper: Strategic behavior in Schelling dynamics: A new result and experimental evidence (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:soceco:v:57:y:2015:i:c:p:134-147
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