Endogenous and costly institutional deterrence in a public good experiment

David Kingsley and Thomas C. Brown

Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), 2016, vol. 62, issue C, 33-41

Abstract: Modern societies rely on formal, central authority institutions that regulate the behavior of all members of society. This paper investigates the formation of a central authority regime within a linear public good experiment. The institution is funded by a fixed cost that increases with the level of deterrence, which is specified as the number of group members who are likely to be monitored. The level of deterrence is both exogenously and endogenously determined, allowing investigation of the effect of endogenous selection. The results indicate no significant positive endogenous selection effect. Indeed, in contrast to the existing literature, when a non-deterrent central authority is endogenously determined contributions tend to decrease.

Keywords: Public good experiment; Central authority; Deterrence; Endogenous selection (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 D63 D70 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:soceco:v:62:y:2016:i:c:p:33-41

DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2016.03.005

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