GO figure: Analytic and strategic skills are separable
Sascha Baghestanian and
Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), 2016, vol. 64, issue C, 71-80
We measure the game behavior and analytic reasoning skills of expert strategic reasoners: professional GO players. We argue for a distinction between what we call “strategic” and “analytic” reasoning skills and present separate measures to elicit strategic and analytic abilities. The paper investigates the behavior of our subject pool in many different types of one-shot games, including the Traveler’s Dilemma, Centipede, Kreps, and Matching Pennies games. We observe that increased strategic skill predicts a greater probability of Nash behavior, while greater analytic skill predicts more cooperative play, even when such behavior is inconsistent with individual rationality.
Keywords: Experimental economics; Cognitive ability; Economic psychology; Social preferences; Centipede; Traveler’s Dilemma; Matching Pennies; Kreps (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C81 C83 C90 D01 D03 D87 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:soceco:v:64:y:2016:i:c:p:71-80
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