Confirmation: What's in the evidence?
Mitesh Kataria ()
Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), 2016, vol. 65, issue C, 9-15
The difference between accommodated evidence (i.e., when evidence is known first and then a hypothesis is proposed to explain and fit the observations) and predicted evidence (i.e., when evidence verifies the prediction of a hypothesis formulated before observing the evidence) is investigated in this article. According to the purely logical approach of Bayesian confirmation theory, accommodated and predicted evidence constitute equally strong confirmation. Using a survey experiment on a sample of students, however, it is shown that predicted evidence is perceived to constitute stronger confirmation than accommodated evidence. The results show that predictions work as a signal about the scientists’ (the proposer of the hypothesis) knowledge which in turn provides stronger confirmation.
Keywords: Subjective beliefs; Evidence; Prediction; Postdiction; Retrodiction (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C11 C12 C80 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: Confirmation: What's in the evidence? (2015)
Working Paper: Confirmation: What's in the evidence? (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:soceco:v:65:y:2016:i:c:p:9-15
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