When charities compete: A laboratory experiment with simultaneous public goods
Justin Krieg and
Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), 2017, vol. 66, issue C, 40-57
What happens when charities compete? We begin to answer this question through a laboratory experiment in which subjects play two public goods games simultaneously. We systematically vary the incentives for contributing in one of the games – investigating the effects of recognition, a bonus conditional on contributing, and non-monetary sanctions – and measure the effect on contributions in both games. Monetary incentives in the form of conditional bonuses increase contributions, even when two games are played simultaneously. However, non-monetary incentives such as recognition and sanctions are less effective than in related literature on games played in isolation. Moreover, we find mixed evidence of a treatment spillover on the un-treated games – bonuses increase contributions initially, recognition decreases contributions, and sanctions have no effect.
Keywords: Public goods; Laboratory experiment; Behavioral spillover; Recognition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:soceco:v:66:y:2017:i:c:p:40-57
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