Serial correlation in National Football League play calling and its effects on outcomes
Noha Emara (),
John Smith () and
Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), 2017, vol. 69, issue C, 125-132
We investigate the strategic behavior of highly informed agents playing zero-sum games under highly incentivized conditions. We examine data from 3455 National Football League (NFL) games from the 2000 season through the 2012 season, and categorize each play as “rush” or a “pass.” We find that the pass-rush mix exhibits negative serial correlation: play types alternate more frequently than an independent stochastic process. This is a seemingly exploitable strategy, and we find that this serial correlation, according to two distinct measures, negatively affects play efficacy. Our analysis suggests that teams could profit from more clustered play selections, which switch play type less frequently. Our results are consistent with teams excessively switching play types in an effort to be perceived as unpredictable.
Keywords: Serial correlation; Game theory; Mixed strategies; Matching pennies (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C93 D03 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: Serial correlation in National Football League play calling and its effects on outcomes (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:soceco:v:69:y:2017:i:c:p:125-132
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