When knowledge is not power: Asymmetric information, probabilistic deceit detection and threats in ultimatum bargainingAuthor-Name: Chavanne, David

Mark Ferreira

Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), 2017, vol. 69, issue C, 4-17

Abstract: We find that probabilistic deceit detection and cheap-talk threats enhance the fairness and honesty of a bargainer who possesses advantageous information and has the opportunity to be deceitful. In our ultimatum game, only proposers know the size of the pie. Proposers, therefore, have the option to understate the pie size and make their offer appear fairer than it really is. The separate and interactive effects of probabilistic deceit detection and cheap-talk threats have implications for how exchange can be facilitated by mechanisms that detect deceit and/or enable buyer communication in markets where sellers have informational advantages.

Keywords: Asymmetric information; Deception; Ultimatum games; Cheap talk; Threats (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C91 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:soceco:v:69:y:2017:i:c:p:4-17

DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2017.05.004

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