Intentions under cover – Hiding intentions is considered unfair
Tim Friehe and
Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), 2018, vol. 73, issue C, 11-21
Unkind intentions provoke negative reciprocity, making their concealment potentially beneficial. This paper explores whether people hide their intentions from others and how hiding intentions is perceived in fairness terms. Our experimental data show a high frequency of cover-up attempts and that affected parties punish the concealment of intentions, indicating that people consider not only unkind intentions but also hiding intentions unfair. When choosing whether or not to hide intentions, subjects trade-off the lower punishment when hiding unkind intentions is successful against the higher punishment when cover up fails. We show that hiding unkind intentions is treated differently than unkind intentions in punishment terms.
Keywords: Intentions; Reciprocity; Punishment; Fairness; Avoidance; Cover up; Experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D03 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
Working Paper: Intentions Undercover - Hiding Intentions is Considered Unfair (2015)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:soceco:v:73:y:2018:i:c:p:11-21
Access Statistics for this article
Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics) is currently edited by Ofer Azar
More articles in Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics) from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Dana Niculescu ().