Do collective incentives enhance performance? A case study of reserve soccer teams

Guy Elaad

Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), 2019, vol. 80, issue C, 121-129

Abstract: Reserve teams from the third-tier in Germany are denied promotion to the top two divisions under the regulation that forbids participation of two teams from the same club in the same league. As a result, reserve teams lack the motivation that is typical of other teams. A comparison of the results of reserve teams in a league where promotion is allowed (the German fourth-tier leagues) to results of reserve teams in leagues where promotion is denied (the German third-tier league and the Dutch and Portuguese second-tier leagues) shows that promotion opportunities enhance both motivation and performance of reserve teams.

Date: 2019
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:soceco:v:80:y:2019:i:c:p:121-129

DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2019.04.003

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