Revisiting generosity in the dictator game: Experimental evidence from Pakistan
Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), 2020, vol. 84, issue C
This paper revisits the influence of unearned money, anonymity of the decisions and religiosity on generosity in the dictator game with charity as a recipient. The results of the experiments performed in Pakistan show that women are significantly less generous when donating with earned as compared to unearned money while men are equally generous with both unearned and earned money. The anonymity of the decisions does not significantly influence the behavior of both men and women. Moreover, women are more generous than men only when the decisions are exercised with unearned money, with earned money there are no significant gender differences in generosity. Interestingly donating all income is the modal choice in all the treatments and average donations are more than 50% of the income. Lastly subjects with higher religiosity donate significantly more than those with lower religiosity and their donations are primarily driven by the religious teachings as well.
Keywords: Unearned; Anonymous; Religiosity; Dictator game; Religious teachings (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:soceco:v:84:y:2020:i:c:s2214804319302083
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