 Conditional Pension Funds to Combat Cheating in Sporting Contests: Theory and Experimental EvidenceQin Wu, Ralph-C Bayer () and Liam Lenten Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), 2020, vol. 89, issue C Abstract: This paper proposes a new anti-doping policy. In a conditional pension scheme, athletes have to pay a fraction of their proceeds from sports into a fund from which they can draw only well after their careers and if they have never been caught doping. Theoretically, this fund has two important advantages over conventional anti-doping policies such as bans and fines. It does not lose its deterrence effect when athletes approach the end of their careers (unlike bans), and it can deal with the widespread problem that drug cheats are often only found out much later when the detection technology has caught up with doping practices. We theoretically compare this new scheme with traditional anti-doping measures. Since empirical tests in the field are infeasible, we run laboratory experiments to compare the effectiveness of fines, bans and conditional pension funds. Date: 2020 Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:soceco:v:89:y:2020:i:c:s2214804319304859 DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2020.101537 Access Statistics for this article Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics) is currently edited by Pablo Brañas Garza More articles in Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics) from Elsevier |
Is your work missing from RePEc? Here is how to contribute.
Questions or problems? Check the EconPapers FAQ or send mail to .
EconPapers is hosted by the
School of Business at Örebro University.