Machiavelli Preferences Without Blame: Delegating Selfish vs. Generous Decisions in Dictator Games
Glynis Gawn and
Robert Innes
Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), 2021, vol. 90, issue C
Abstract:
Does the impulse to delegate a decision only arise when delegation mimics a selfish decision vs. a generous one? We address this question using a dictator experiment with two possible payment allocations and an option to delegate the payment decision to another player. Two delegation treatments are considered, one in which the delegation option is payoff-equivalent to a direct choice of a “selfish” allocation (better for the dictator, worse for the receiver) and another where it is equivalent to the direct choice of generous / equal payments. Dictators exhibit a significantly greater propensity to delegate in the selfish delegation treatment than in the generous delegation treatment. Results are consistent with “Machiavelli preferences” that only favor delegation when it promotes self-interested / other-harming outcomes.
Keywords: Delegation; Moral Preference; Dictator Game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D03 D91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)
Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2214804320302639
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:soceco:v:90:y:2021:i:c:s2214804320302639
DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2020.101615
Access Statistics for this article
Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics) is currently edited by Pablo Brañas Garza
More articles in Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics) from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().