EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Central Bank Transparency with (semi-)public Information: Laboratory Experiments

Emna Trabelsi and Walid Hichri

Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), 2021, vol. 90, issue C

Abstract: Strategies of public announcements pose challenges to central banks. Theory shows that full transparency is not always good. In this paper, we propose to assess two forms of partial public disclosure by central banks (“fragmented information” and “partially hidden information” strategies) in two beauty contest games, as well as a scenario where public information is fully disclosed. Based on laboratory experiments, we offer original evidence that the “fragmented information” strategy outperforms the “partially hidden information” strategy in terms of social welfare, as central banks can better control the mean squared distance of agents’ actions from the true state of fundamentals (i.e., Mean squared action error) and the dispersion of agents’ behavior with “fragmented information”, while both partial transparency strategies similarly alleviate agents’ overreaction to fully disclosed public information. We also find that divergence from the Nash equilibrium emphasizes heterogeneity of behavior that is entailed by boundedly rational reasoning, especially in early periods of a game. Further, we build on choice reinforcement and belief-based learning models to better understand how subjects learn over time to improve their performance. How well those learning models fit the data depends on the game played by the subjects.

Keywords: central bank transparency; overreaction; convergence to equilibrium; Level-K; choice reinforcement learning; belief-based learning (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 C92 D82 E58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2214804320306881
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
Working Paper: Central Bank Transparency with (semi-)public Information: Laboratory Experiments (2021)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:soceco:v:90:y:2021:i:c:s2214804320306881

DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2020.101645

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics) is currently edited by Pablo Brañas Garza

More articles in Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics) from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-31
Handle: RePEc:eee:soceco:v:90:y:2021:i:c:s2214804320306881