Coping with advantageous inequity—Field evidence from professional penalty kicking

Mario Lackner and Hendrik Sonnabend

Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), 2021, vol. 91, issue C

Abstract: This contribution examines the effect of advantageous inequity on performance using natural data from a high-stakes environment. We use data from top-level penalty kicking in soccer and thereby expand the empirical literature dominated by evidence from laboratory experiments to data from the field. Results indicate that, on average, professionals do not perform worse when they experience unfair advantages. However, we find suggestive evidence for a negative effect of advantageous inequity in situations where success is less important. Our results are robust to alternative model specifications and to adjustments for multiple testing.

Keywords: Advantageous inequity; Guilt; Self-serving bias; Fairness; Performance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C93 D91 Z29 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2214804321000185
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
Working Paper: Coping with advantageous inequity - Field evidence from professional penalty kicking (2017)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:soceco:v:91:y:2021:i:c:s2214804321000185

DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2021.101678

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics) is currently edited by Pablo Brañas Garza

More articles in Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics) from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().