Robin Hood meets Pinocchio: Justifications increase cheating behavior but decrease physiological tension

Guy Hochman, Dar Peleg, Dan Ariely and Shahar Ayal

Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), 2021, vol. 92, issue C

Abstract: We investigated whether altruistic justification increases cheating behavior while suppressing its associated physiological arousal. In the first study (n = 60), participants strategically employed altruistic considerations to justify their dishonesty and promote their personal goals. In the second study (n = 110), participants who worked to benefit others (compared to participants who worked to benefit themselves) cheated more and were less likely to be detected by a lie detector test. In addition, among participants who worked to benefit others, more honest participants experienced higher psychological distress than dishonest participants. These findings suggest that physiological arousal may be a good indicator of self-interest cheating, but not justified one.

Keywords: Cheating detection; Altruism; Strategic cheating (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:soceco:v:92:y:2021:i:c:s2214804321000392

DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2021.101699

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