How do informal norms affect rule compliance: Experimental evidence

Pavitra Govindan

Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), 2022, vol. 96, issue C

Abstract: I use a dictator game experiment to show that an individual’s compliance with an egalitarian formal rule depends on his/her group’s informal norms. A group of dictators communicate with each other to decide the “guideline” for the amount of money to send to their matched recipients. This guideline functions as the group’s informal norm and significantly affects the sending behavior of dictators despite being non-binding. Next, an egalitarian formal rule is introduced that requires dictators to send at least half of their money to a matched recipient. Dictators are less likely to obey the egalitarian rule if they are in groups with more selfish norms.

Keywords: Social norm; Formal rule; Rule compliance; Dictator game; Pre-play communication; Lab experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C90 C91 C92 D91 K0 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:soceco:v:96:y:2022:i:c:s221480432100135x

DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2021.101795

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