Probability matching and strategic decision making
Duk Gyoo Kim and
Hee Chun Kim
Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), 2022, vol. 98, issue C
Abstract:
This paper examines a link between an individual’s (possibly limited) strategic thinking in the 11–20 money request game and (possibly non-rational) decision-making patterns in the matching pennies games. Experimental evidence shows that subjects’ strategic behavior, which used to be understood as a result of finite cognitive iterations, is closely related to their choice randomization patterns. Ignoring some individuals’ choice randomization may bias the population variance of levels in cognitive iterations. Choice randomizers, which we call probability matchers, are non-rational in both the non-strategic and strategic settings, but their choice patterns are systematic—although inconsistent with rational decisions—and similar.
Keywords: Level-k reasoning; Probability matching; Cognitive bound; Preference for randomization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:soceco:v:98:y:2022:i:c:s2214804322000258
DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2022.101850
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