 Reaching agreement on contribution behavior in different cultures-a public goods game with representatives in Japan and GermanyAndrew Isaak, Christiane Schwieren and Yoshio Iida Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), 2022, vol. 99, issue C Abstract: We discuss the results of an experimental public good game with group representatives in Germany and Japan, societies with varying levels of individualism. Representatives are permitted to communicate with their constituencies, but not with other representatives. We focus on accountability between representative and his constituency and on the risk taken in the interaction between representatives. We find that in Germany, subjects more readily trust a stranger's cooperativeness, groups reach agreement faster and are quicker to discuss and formulate a strategy in pre-play communication vis-a-vis Japanese subjects, where group formation takes longer. Further, we find a stronger end effect in Germany than in Japan, where the period of play explains much less variance in contribution behavior. Keywords: Public goods; Negotiation; Decision-making; Communication; Culture; Experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:soceco:v:99:y:2022:i:c:s2214804322000684 DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2022.101894 Access Statistics for this article Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics) is currently edited by Pablo Brañas Garza More articles in Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics) from Elsevier |
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